

LA CRITICA INFONDATA A *PRINCIPIA IURIS* DI ALBERTO ARTOSI

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Abstract. The present work contains the reply to the article by Alberto Artosi "*La verità dietro i 'Principia' o le contraddizioni del normativo*" appeared in the current number of i-lex. Against the "*irreparable contradiction*" identified by Artosi in P3, that, according to the claims of the author, would cause the failure of axiomatization developed in *Principia iuris*, the work demonstrates:

1) The epistemological error of confusing the purely formal systems (not interpreted systems) with the systems and formalized empirical theories (interpreted formal systems).

More precisely, it is the error which consists in confusing the purely formal systems - such as mathematical systems or purely logical systems - which are uninterpreted syntactic systems, with formalized systems and empirical theories - such as my theory of law - which are interpreted formal systems, that is, systems that not only allow, but require interpretations of their axioms as it is the one associated to my postulate P3. Postulate P3 - it seems not useless to point it out - is not a logical thesis, but a specific postulate of my theory of law. An inconsistent formal system, unlike my theory of law, could not be satisfied by any interpretation;

2) The logical error of criticism is concerned with the conventional usage of predictive logic according to which one must use signs of different predicates for predicates of different grade. In particular, Artosi ignores the postulate introduced to support an exception to that convention $PM(y)(Py \equiv M(\exists x)Pyx)$. From the ignorance of the postulate and its corollaries - that operate as transformation rules in my calculation - some errors and theoretical misunderstandings follow. In particular, it follows the denial of the possibility of not appealing to the second-order language, possibility which allows, in general, the transformation of a monadic context into the corresponding dyadic context and vice versa, provided that the latter is subjected to the operator of possibility and that the argument through which the relation is predicated is existentially quantified.

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